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BOOK REVIEWS

expense, justified by the "punishment principle". Dr. Menninger does
not attempt to prescribe penalties for specific crimes, but urges that
effective, reasonable and humane penalties could be set if public
vengeance could be ignored.
The author hopes that his reader will become concerned enough
to investigate for himself. He says the criminal justice system "is a
creaking, groaning monster through whose heartless jaws hundreds of
American citizens grind daily, to be maimed and embittered so that
they emerge implacable enemies of the social order and confirmed in
their 'criminality'." The high rate of recidivism among criminal offenders has emphasized this point.
In closing, the author reviews the remarkable strides of the last
twenty years in the care and treatment of the mentally ill, all of which
is a direct result of the public's concern. He predicts that,
[s]omeday, somewhere, the same thing will happen with respect to
transgressors and offenders. It will be harder to bring about, for reasons
we have given: the public has a fascination for violence, and clings
tenaciously to its yen for vengeance, blind and deaf to the expense,
futility, and dangerousness of the resulting penal system. But we are
bound to hope that this will yield in time to the persistent, penetrating
light of intelligence and accumulating scientific knowledge. The public
will grow increasingly ashamed of its cry for retaliation, its persistent
demand to punish. This is its crime, our crime against criminals-and
incidentally our crime against ourselves. For before we can diminish
our sufferings from the ill controlled aggressive assaults of fellow
citizens, we must renounce the philosophy of punishment, the obsolete,
vengeful penal attitude. In its place we would seek a comprehensive,
constructive social attitude-therapeutic in some instances, restraining
in some instances, but preventive in its total social impact. 1

This book should be read by the public as well as by those
concerned with the administration of criminal justice, for it is society
which ultimately is harmed by the failure of the system to correct and
reform those who pass through our correctional system.
Harold E. Black
Deputy Commissioner
Kentucky Department of Corrections
OIGINs OF THE FIFTH AMENDMEN: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INanmATIoN. By Leonard Levy. New York: Oxford University Press,

1968. Pp. 561. $12.50.
Leonard Levy has once again proved that historians can write legal
history and write it well. With this book he has established himself as
I K. MErNNIGER, THE CRnME OF PuNisEa~mNT 280 (1968).

KE-TucKY LAw JoRN

[Vol.
V5 57,

one of the foremost scholars of Anglo-American law. Furthermore,
he has filled one of the multitude of gaps in the history of constitutional
development. Finally, he has found something in the American legal
tradition for which the more zealous civil libertarians can be thankful.
As the title of his book suggests, Levy has endeavored to give us a
definitive history of the origins of the right against self-incrimination
embodied in the fifth amendment. Of course he cannot do so without
probing into the mysteries of English law, and probe he does. When
he is finished with the task of translating English customs into American practice, he posits the thesis that American legalists truly believed
in a right against self-incrimination as an adjunct of due process. He
emphasizes that the fifth amendment was intended to incorporate a
right, not a privilege, and in so doing endorses the view of the most
ardent libertarians of the Warren Court. In short, this historian who
when he explored the colonial and early national attitude toward freedom of speech and the press, found a legacy of suppression,
and who, when he examined Thomas Jefferson and civil liberties, found
a persistent, profound and comprehensive darker side, has, in his
latest venture into the archives, discovered a more positive tradition
of American civil liberties.
Much of Levy's book concerns the rather oppressive procedures of
English ecclesiastical tribunals and the efforts of their victims to
circumvent them. Not surprisingly, many of the theories underlying
the right against self-incrimination came from the mouths of martyrs
facing fanatical inquisitors. The Church had invented an oath exofficio whereby a party brought before an ecclesiastical court would
have to swear to answer truthfully all questions, no matter how incriminating. Such a device was obviously useful to heretic hunters
since, in effect, errant clergy could be forced to condemn themselves
without independent investigation and establishment of guilt. The
most enterprising of the accused inevitably groped for ways to foil
their accusers, and many of them came up with an untested maxim,
nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, which meant that no man is bound to
betray himself. Thus, if the Church was to locate a fresh heretic she
would have to do so on her own. Judges were seldom amenable to
such arguments, but sometimes alleged recusants did delay or avoid
punishment because of their legal ingenuity and their silence.
One of the most assiduous prosecutors of theological seditionists
was John Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury under Queen Elizabeth.
Whitgift helped found the High Commission as a tool to establish
religious conformity and used it with great effect on the increasing
number of English clerics who embraced some form of Puritanism.
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Despite his successes, Whitgift did encounter some opposition from
Parliament and a great deal from such astute Puritan lawyers and
thinkers as Thomas Cartvright, James Morice and Nicholas Fuller.
It was only through the personal intervention of Queen Elizabeth herself that Whitgift and his High Commission were able to withstand

these assaults which were based, inter alia, upon an alleged right
against self-incrimination. Even though they usually lost the battles,
the learned lawyers of left-wing Protestantism made enormous contributions to the theory of the right of silence, especially when they
cleverly, though fallaciously, began to ground their attacks upon the
Magna Carta.
The Puritans pursued the battle against self-incrimination and
the High Commission with more zeal and profit under the early
Stuarts. Increasingly they called upon the common law courts, controlled in large part by their supporters, to enjoin the proceedings of
the King's prerogative courts which specialized in the doctrines of
compulsory testimony. The fall of the monarchy during the English
Civil War removed one obstacle to the sought-after civil liberty, and
eventually Englishmen acquiesced in the right to silence, but only
after the Puritans enjoyed a period of their own brand of judicial
oppression. Levy assigns a good share of the heroics of his study to
John Lilburne, a professional dissident of the times, whose repeated
appearances before both Stuart and Cromwellian tribunals smacked
with such brilliance that it was almost inevitable that the right against
self-incrimination would attach itself permanently to the growing
body of English civil liberties.
Having established the existence of the right in England by the
middle of the seventeenth century, Levy next pursues his quest in the
American colonies. There he finds the search more formidable, for
colonial legal sources are thinly scattered and often uninformative.
From the skimpy evidence which does exist, he concludes that the
right of silence was only sporadically observed by seventeenth century
American jurists. This is probably because there were too few lawyers
and law books in America and thus much of the English law was in
an undiscovered state. Sophistication came in the eighteenth century
with the rise of a plentiful and educated American bar and the appearance in colonial libraries of an adequate stock of legal treatises
and reports. Levy argues that by the middle of this century the right
against self-incrimination was firmly fixed in many colonies.
Although the Revolution put strains on civil liberties in general,
the specific right of criminal defendants to refuse to bear witness
against themselves was expressly embodied into some of the new
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state constitutions. After the war with Great Britain, many state tribunals recognized the liberty, some to the extent of applying it to
witnesses and to parties in civil disputes. By 1789 there was a viable
corpus of state law and custom endorsing the right, and it was
therefore somewhat natural for James Madison to include it in his
draft of the fifth amendment. Although Levy admits that there is
virtually no evidence concerning legislative intent, he does speculate
from the language itself that the amendment was designed to be broad
in scope and mandatory in application.
Levy's book, although excellent, is not without its weaknesses. The
author devotes too much space to the procedural controversies of
ecclesiastical tribunals and too little to the status of the common law
on the subject of involuntary testimony. Indeed, he hardly broaches
the latter topic until midway in his book, although it would seem to
be more central to his thesis. In addition, he writes excessively about
the religious controversies themselves although they serve only as
background to the legal questions involved. In contrast, Levy conveys
an impression of hastiness in his treatment of the colonial response to
English precedent. Granted the sources are thin, but so, sometimes, is
Levy's discussion of them. Finally, the author seems unduly Whiggish
in his summary remarks on the supposed dedication of the founding
fathers to the right against self-incrimination. That the revolutionary
and constitutional patriarchs were so devoted does not seem to follow
from Levy's preceding discussion; indeed the early legalists of
America seem to have been somewhat uncommitted to many of the
fundatmental elements of what modernists would call "due process.
Despite these errors of emphasis and exaggeration, Levy has given
us a brilliant piece of scholarship on a much-neglected subject.
Robert M. Ireland
Assistant Professor of History
University of Kentucky
A ComMnENTARY ON THm CONSTT=uTON OF THE UNrIED STATES; PnAT III:
RiGHTs OF THE PERsON. 2 vols. By Bernard Schwartz. New York:

Macmillan, 1968. Pp. 1018. $25.00.
Rights of the Person comprises, in two volumes, the third and
concluding part of a comprehensive commentary on the United States
Constitution.1 Part I (two volumes) dealt with the powers of govern1

Its publisher styles it "the most comprehensive commentary on the Con-

stitution yet to appear."

